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ABSTRACT
We use a fully-specified neoclassical model augmented with costly external equity as a laboratory
to study the relations between stock returns and equity financing decisions. Simulations show that
the model can simultaneously and in many cases quantitatively reproduce: procyclical equity
issuance; the negative relation between aggregate equity share and future stock market returns; long-
term underperformance following equity issuance and the positive relation of its magnitude with the
volume of issuance; the mean-reverting behavior in the operating performance of issuing firms; and
the positive long-term stock price drift of firms distributing cash and its positive relation with book-
to-market. We conclude that systematic mispricing seems unnecessary to generate the return-related
evidence often interpreted as behavioral underreaction to market timing.
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We study the dynamic, quantitative relations between stock returns and equity nancing
decisions using a fully-specied neoclassical model augmented with costly external equity.
The issue is important. Recent literature in empirical corporate nance has uncovered
an array of evidence often interpreted as substantiating a window-of-opportunity theory of
nancing decisions in response to systematic mispricing in equity markets. In particular, Rit-
ter (2003) argues that managers can create value for existing shareholders by timing nancing
decisions to take advantage of time-varying relative costs of debt and equity caused by market
ineciencies. Managers can issue equity when their stock prices are high and turn to internal
funds or debt when stock prices are low. As supporting evidence, Ritter cites many empirical
studies that document long-run abnormal returns following corporate nancing events.
Using simulations, we demonstrate that our neoclassical model can reproduce simultane-
ously, and in many cases quantitatively, many stylized facts often interpreted as behavioral
market timing. These facts include: (i) the amount and frequency of equity issuance are pro-
cyclical (e.g., Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993)); (ii) the new equity share in total amount of
new equity and debt nancing is a signicantly negative predictor of aggregate stock market
returns (e.g., Baker and Wurgler (2000)); (iii) rms conducting seasoned equity oerings
underperform nonissuing rms with similar size and book-to-market in the long run, and the
magnitude of this underperformance increases with the volume of issuance (e.g., Loughran
and Ritter (1995), and Spiess and Aect-Graves (1995)); (iv) the operating performance of
issuing rms exhibits substantial improvements prior to the equity oerings, but then deteri-
orates, and issuing rms are also disproportionately high-investing, high-growth rms (e.g.,
Loughran and Ritter (1997)); (v) there exists a positive long-term stock price drift for rmsdistributing cash back to shareholders, and the magnitude of the drift is stronger among
value rms (e.g., Lakonishok and Vermaelen (1990), Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen
(1995), and Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995)); and nally (vi) capital investment is
negatively associated with future stock returns in the cross section, and the magnitude of
this association is stronger among rms with higher cash ows (e.g., Titman, Wei, and Xie
(2004), Anderson and Garcia-Feij oo (2005), Polk and Sapienza (2005), and Xing (2005)).
We deliberately do not include any behavioral bias in our model, in which rms choose
investment and nancing decisions optimally in response to aggregate and rm-specic
productivity shocks. Firm-specic shocks aect corporate decisions through operating cash
ows. And aggregate shocks aect corporate decisions through both operating cash ows
and an exogenously-specied stochastic discount factor that admits a countercyclical price of
risk, as in Berk, Green, and Naik (1999). Our simulations suggest that systematic mispricing
seems unnecessary to generate the evidence often interpreted as behavioral underreaction to
market timing, or more generally, the window-of-opportunity theory of nancing decisions.
However, investor sentiment, for example, as modeled by Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001),
can potentially aect the countercyclical price of risk exogenously specied in our model.
We therefore do not suggest that the timing-related evidence is fully rational, but we do
argue that investor sentiment seems unnecessary.
The intuition driving our results is simple. Controlling for expected productivity, the
investment-to-asset ratio correlates negatively with expected returns: all else equal, rms
with lower costs of capital invest more. And the balance-sheet constraint equating the sources
of funds with the uses of funds implies that equity issuing rms are disproportionally high
investment-to-asset rms and cash-distributing rms are disproportionally low investment-
to-asset rms. The negative investment-return relation then implies that equity issuance
2should correlate negatively with expected returns, and that cash distribution (dividend or
share repurchase) should correlate positively with expected returns. Moreover, because ex-
pected productivity is procyclical, capital investment is also procyclical, a common prediction
across neoclassical models (e.g., Kydland and Prescott (1982)) and a fact well-documented
in the business cycle literature (e.g., King and Rebelo (1999)). The balance-sheet constraint
then implies that new equity share must be procyclical and predict stock market returns
with a negative sign, given that the aggregate expected return is countercyclical.
Firm-level protability is mean-reverting in the model as well as in the data (e.g., Fama
and French (1995, 2000)). Ex-post, equity issuers tend to be rms that have experienced big,
positive rm-specic protability shocks in the recent past. But going forward, issuers face
the same conditional distribution of shocks as other rms do. When looking back at the his-
torical data, econometricians are likely to observe that the operating performance of issuing
rms displays substantial improvements before the issuance but deteriorates afterwards.
Our work is related to several recent papers. Carlson, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004b)
construct a real options model and argue that prior to equity issuance, a rm has an option
to expand along with some assets in place. This composition is levered and risky. If the
exercise of the option is nanced by equity, risk must drop. This mechanism can potentially
generate the long-term underperformance following equity issuance. We complement their
work mainly by analyzing the negative long-term drift following equity issuance and the
positive long-term drift following cash distribution simultaneously in a unied framework.
Carlson et al. leave the cash-distribution side largely open. Moreover, by modeling business
cycles explicitly, we also reproduce the procyclical equity issuance waves and the negative
predictive relation between the new equity share and stock market returns.
In the context of initial public oerings, P astor and Veronesi (2005) develop a model of
3optimal timing in which waves of initial oerings are driven by declines in expected market
returns, increases in expected aggregate protability, or increases in prior uncertainty about
the average future protability of new rms. Our investment-driven mechanisms complement
their insights because we study the powerful role of capital investment in the context of
raising and distributing capital by publicly traded rms and its impact on the cross section
of expected returns. Further, dierent from the P astor and Veronesi (2003, 2005) valuation
framework in the style of Ohlson (1995), our model is rooted in neoclassical economics in
the style of Cochrane (1991).
We also extend Zhang (2005a) by solving explicitly a fully-specied neoclassical model.
Doing this allows us to use computational experiments to evaluate quantitatively to what ex-
tent our economic mechanisms can reproduce the timing-related evidence. While the match
of model moments to data moments is by no means perfect, our simulations demonstrate that
these mechanisms are at least quantitatively relevant, if not important. In contrast, Zhang's
analysis is largely qualitative, although the scope of his analysis is broader. Our simulations
also yield several additional insights including, among others, the procyclical equity issuance,
the predictive relation between the new equity share and stock market returns, the positive
relation between the volume of issuance and the magnitude of the underperformance, and
the mean-reverting operating performance of issuing rms.
The rest is organized as follows. We construct the dynamic model in Section 2. Section 3
calibrates and solves the model. Section 4 simulates the model and presents the quantitative
results. Section 5 briey discusses related literature. Finally, Section 6 concludes.
42 The Model
We construct a fully-specied neoclassical model, similar to that used in Zhang (2005b),
augmented with costly equity nancing. While Zhang studies the value premium, we
study nancing-related anomalies. It is reassuring, to us at least, that models with similar
microeconomic foundations can be used to confront dierent anomalies, even though these
anomalies are often treated in dierent strands of the empirical nance literature.
We start by describing the technology and stochastic discount factor in the economy. We
then delineate how rms maximize their market value by making their investment, nancing,
and payout decisions. Finally, we discuss how risk and expected returns are determined
endogenously in connection with these corporate policies.
Technology Production requires one input, capital, kt, and is subject to both an aggregate
productivity shock and an idiosyncratic productivity shock. The aggregate shock, xt, has a
stationary and monotone Markov transition function, Qx(xt+1jxt), and is given by:




t+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal variable. The aggregate shock is the unique source of
systematic risk; otherwise all rms will have expected returns equal to the real interest rate.
In the model, the rm-specic shock is the unique source of rm heterogeneity. The rm-
specic shock, zjt, is uncorrelated across rms, indexed by j, and have a common stationary
and monotone Markov transition function, Qz(zjt+1jzjt), given by:




jt+1 is an i.i.d. standard normal variable. "z
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where yjt and kjt are the operating prots and capital stock of rm j at time t, respectively.
Further, 0<<1, so the production displays decreasing return to scale.
Stochastic Discount Factor Following Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), we specify
exogenously the stochastic discount factor without solving the consumer's problem. This
research strategy seems reasonable because we aim to link expected returns to rm
characteristics through value-maximizing corporate policies.
Let mt+1 denote the stochastic discount factor from time t to t+1. We specify
logmt+1 = log + t (xt   xt+1) (4)
t = 0 + 1(xt   x) (5)
where 1 >  > 0, 0 > 0, and 1 < 0 are constant parameters. Equation (4) is in essence
a reduced-form representation of the intertemporal rate of substitution for a ctitious
representative consumer. To capture the time-varying price of risk, equation (5) assumes
that t decreases in the demeaned aggregate productivity, xt  x. We remain agnostic about
the economic forces driving the time-varying price of risk. Potential sources include, among
others, countercyclical risk aversion (e.g., Campbell and Cochrane (1999)), countercyclical
amount of economic uncertainty (e.g., Bansal and Yaron (2004)), and loss aversion (e.g.,
Barberis, Huang, and Santos (2001)).
6Corporate Policies Upon observing the current aggregate and rm-specic productivity
levels, rm j chooses optimal investment, ijt, to maximize its market value. The capital
accumulation follows:
kjt+1 = ijt + (1   )kjt (6)
where  denotes the depreciation rate, which is constant across time and across rms.
Capital investment entails quadratic adjustment costs, denoted cjt:







kjt where a > 0 (7)
The adjustment-cost function satises that @c=@i>0, @2c=@i2 >0, and @c=@k<0. In other
words, both the total and the marginal costs increase with the level of investment. The total
adjustment cost also decreases with capital, displaying economy of scale.
When the sum of investment, ijt, and adjustment cost, cjt, exceeds internal funds, yjt,
the rm raises new equity capital, ejt, from the external equity markets:
ejt  maxf0;ijt + cjt   yjtg (8)
We assume that the equity is the only source of external nancing. This simplication is
reasonable because we focus on the dynamic relations between stock returns and equity
nancing decisions. The relation between stock returns and debt oerings is also interesting
(e.g., Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1999)), but we leave that topic for future research.
External equity nancing is costly (e.g., Smith (1977), Lee, Lochhead, Ritter, and Zhao
(1996), Altinkilic and Hansen (2000)). To capture this eect, we follow Gomes (2001) and
Hennessy and Whited (2005) and assume that for each dollar of external equity raised by the
rm, it must pay proportional otation costs. We also capture xed costs of equity nance.
7The total nancing-cost function is hence parameterized as:
jt  (ejt) = 01fejt>0g + 1ejt (9)
where 0>0 captures the xed costs, 1fejt>0g is the indicator function that takes the value
of one if the event described in fg occurs, and 1ejt>0 captures the proportional costs.
When the sum of investment and adjustment cost is lower than internal funds, the rm
pays the dierence back to shareholders. The payout, djt, is thus:
djt  maxf0;yjt   ijt   cjtg (10)
The rm does not incur any costs when paying dividends or conducting share repurchase.
We do not model corporate cash holdings or the specic forms of the payout because these
ingredients are not necessary for our economic questions at hand. Equation (10) only pins
down the total amount paid to shareholders, but not the methods of distribution.
Because there are costs associated with raising capital, but not with distributing payout,
rms will only use external equity as the last resort when internal funds are not sucient
to nance current investment. Equivalently, it is never optimal to issue new equity while
paying cash back to shareholders.
Dynamic Value Maximization Let v(kjt;zjt;xt) denote the market value of equity for
rm j. And dene:
e djt  djt   ejt   (ejt) = yjt   ijt   cjt   (maxf0;ijt + cjt   yjtg) (11)
e djt is the eective cash accrued to the shareholder that equals cash distribution minus the
sum of external equity raised and the nancing costs. We can now formulate the dynamic





mt+1v(kjt+1;zjt+1;xt+1)Qz (dzjt+1jzjt)Qx (dxt+1jxt) (12)
subject to the capital accumulation equation (6).
Risk and Expected Return In our model, risk and expected returns are determined
endogenously along with value-maximizing corporate policies. Evaluating the value function
at the optimum yields:
vjt = e djt + Et [mt+1vjt+1] , 1 = Et [mt+1rjt+1] (13)
where rm j's stock return is dened as:
rjt+1 
vjt+1
vjt   e djt
(14)
Note that v(kjt;zjt;xt) is the cum-dividend rm value. Dene pjt  vjt  e djt to be the ex-
dividend rm value, then rjt+1 reduces to the usual denition, rjt+1=
pjt+1+e djt+1
pjt .
We can rewrite equation (13) as the beta-pricing form (e.g., Cochrane (2001, p.19)):
Et[rjt+1] = rft + jtmt (15)
where rft 1










9From equations (15) and (16), it is clear that risk and expected returns are two
endogenous variables to be determined along with optimal rm-value and policy functions.
All endogenous variables are functions of three state variables, the endogenous state, kjt,
and two exogenous states, xt and zjt. The functional forms are not available analytically but
they can be obtained using numerical techniques.
3 Solving the Model
To solve the model, we rst need to calibrate 14 parameters (,  x, x, x, z, z, , f, 0, 1,
, a, 0, and 1) by matching at least 14 moments. The success of this procedure depends on
picking moments that can identify these parameters. A sucient condition for identication
is a one-to-one mapping between the vector of parameters and a subset of the data moments
with the same dimension. Although the model does not yield such a closed-form mapping,
we exercise care in choosing appropriate moments to match.
All parameters are calibrated in monthly frequency. We start with three aggregate return
moments including the mean and volatility of real interest rate and the average Sharpe ratio.
As in Zhang (2005b), we use these three moments to pin down tightly the three parameters
in the stochastic discount factor.1 The long-run average level of the aggregate productivity
 x is purely a scaling variable. We choose its numerical value to be  3:751 such that the
average long-run level of assets is approximately one.
The persistence of the aggregate productivity, x, is set to be
3 p
0:95, and its conditional
volatility, x, is set to be 0:007=3=0:0023. With the rst-order autoregressive specication
for xt in equation (1), these monthly parameter values correspond to quarter values of 0.95
1Specically, the log pricing kernel in equations (4) and (5) implies that the real interest rate
is 1=Et[mt+1] = (1=)exp( m   (1=2)2




m=2), where m[0+1(xt  x)](1 x)(xt  x) and mx[0+1(xt  x)].
10and 0.007, respectively, as in Cooley and Prescott (1995). To choose the persistence z
and conditional volatility z of the rm-specic productivity, we follow Gomes, Kogan, and
Zhang (2003) and Zhang (2005b) and restrict these two parameters using the cross-sectional
moments of rm distribution. One direct measure of the dispersion is the cross-sectional
volatility of individual stock returns. Another measure is the cross-sectional standard
deviation of market-to-book. These goals are achieved by setting z=0:965 and z=0:10.
Following Hennessy and Whited (2005), we use as empirical targets ve simple summary
statistics: the mean and volatility of investment-to-asset, the average ratio of operating
income to assets, the frequency of equity issuance, and the average ratio of net equity to
assets. The average investment-to-asset helps identify the depreciation rate , the volatility
of investment-to-asset helps identify the adjustment-cost parameter a, the average operating
income-to-asset ratio helps identify the curvature of the production function , and the two
nancing variables help identify the nancing-cost parameters 0 and 1. Finally, we choose
the xed cost, f, to match the average market-to-book ratio to that in the data.
Table 1 reports our calibration of parameter values. Other than a few exceptions, these
parameter values are similar to those used in Zhang (2005b). Using this parametrization,
we solve the model using the standard value function iteration technique (see Appendix A
for a detailed description of our algorithm). We then simulate the model using the value
function and optimal policy functions to create an articial panel of 5000 rms with 480
monthly observations for each rm. This procedure is repeated 100 times. Table 2 reports
the model-implied unconditional sample moments averaged across these 100 simulations.
The overall t reported in Table 2 seems reasonably good. The mean and volatility
of risk-free rate and the average Sharpe ratio simulated from the model are very close to
those observed in the data. This t is perhaps not surprising because we pin down three
11Table 1 : Parameter Choices
This table reports our parameter choices. We need to calibrate 14 parameters: the capital share ; the long-
run average level of aggregate productivity  x; the persistence of aggregate productivity x; the conditional
volatility of aggregate productivity shocks x; the persistence of rm-specic productivity z; the conditional
volatility of rm-specic productivity shocks z; the three parameters in the stochastic discount factor ,
0, and 1; the xed cost of production f; the rate of capital depreciation ; the adjustment-cost parameter
a; the xed cost of nancing 0; and the proportional factor of nancing costs 1.
  x x x z z  0 1 f  a 0 1
0.70  3:751 0:951=3 0.007/3 0.965 0.100 0.994 50  1000 0.005 0.01 15 0.08 0.025
parameters, ;0, and 1, using exactly these three moments. The model moments of the
investment-to-asset ratio are also close to its data moments. The average market-to-book
ratio in the model, 1.88, is close to that in the data, 1.49. One caveat is that the frequency
of equity issuance in the model, 28.5%, is much higher than that in the data, 9.9%. The
reason is probably that in the model external equity is the only source of outside funds.
Figure 1 plots our numerical solutions of the value function and the optimal investment
policy against the endogenous state variable, capital stock k, and the two exogenous state
variables, aggregate productivity x and rm-specic productivity z. Because there are three
state variables, we rst x x= x and plot the functions against k and z in Panels A and C.
We then x z= z and plot the functions against k and x in Panels B and D. From Panels A
and B, because of decreasing return to scale, rm value is increasing and concave function of
capital k. The value function also increases with aggregate productivity x and rm-specic
productivity z. From Panels C and D, investment-to-asset decreases with capital stock k but
increases with aggregate and rm-specic productivity. Our model thus predicts that small
rms with relatively less assets-in-place and growth rms with relatively high protability
tend to invest more and grow faster, consistent with Fama and French (1995).
12Figure 1 : The Value Function and Optimal Investment Policy Function
This gure plots the value function v(k;z;x) and the investment-to-asset ratio i
k(k;z;x) as functions of
one endogenous state variable k, and two exogenous state variables x and z. Because there are three state
variables, we x x =  x and plot the value and policy functions against k and z in Panels A and C, respectively,
in which the arrows indicate the direction along which z increases. We then x z =  z and plot the value and
policy functions against k and x in Panels B and D, respectively, in which the arrows indicate the direction
along which x increases.
Panel A: v(k;z;  x) Panel B: v(k;  z;x)
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13Table 2 : Unconditional Moments from the Simulated and Real Data
This table reports unconditional sample moments generated from the simulated data and from the real data.
We simulate 100 articial panels each of which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observation. We report the
cross-simulation averaged results. The average Sharpe ratio in the data is from Campbell and Cochrane
(1999). The data moments of the real interest rate are from Campbell, Lo, and MacKinlay (1997). All other
data moments are from Hennessy and Whited (2005).
Data Model
Average annual risk free rate 0.018 0.021
Annual volatility of risk free rate 0.030 0.029
Average annual Sharpe ratio 0.430 0.405
Average annual investment-to-asset ratio 0.130 0.119
The volatility of investment-to-asset ratio 0.006 0.013
Average annual operating income-to-asset ratio 0.146 0.255
The frequency of equity issuance 0.099 0.285
Average new equity-to-asset ratio 0.042 0.043
Average market-to-book ratio 1.493 1.879
The volatility of market-to-book 0.230 0.242
Based on the optimal investment-to-asset ratio, we plot in Figure 2 the implied new
equity-to-asset ratio and the payout-to-asset ratio from equations (8) and (10). From Panels
A and B, the new equity-to-asset ratio closely mimics the patterns of the investment-to-asset
ratio. Small rms with relatively less capital and growth rms with relatively high rm-
specic productivity tend to issue more equity. This prediction is largely consistent with
the evidence documented in Barclay, Smith, and Watts (1995) and Fama and French (2005).
And from Panel B, rms tend to use more equity when aggregate economic conditions are
relatively good, i.e., when x is high, a pattern consistent with the evidence in Choe, Masulis,
and Nanda (1993). Finally, from Panels C and D, the payout-to-asset ratio increases with
capital stock, although the relation is not strictly monotonic. Small rms with less assets
distribute relatively little cash, while big rms with more assets distribute more. This
prediction also is consistent with Barclay et al., who report that dividend yields correlate
positively with the log of total sales, a measure of rm size.
14Figure 2 : Optimal Equity-Financing and Payout Police-Functions
This gure plots the new equity-to-asset ratio e
k(k;z;x) and the payout-to-asset ratio d
k(k;z;x) as functions
of one endogenous state variable, capital stock k, and two exogenous state variables, aggregate and rm-
specic productivity x and z. Because there are three state variables, we x x =  x and plot the functions
against k and z in Panels A and C, in which the arrows indicate the direction along which z increases. In
Panels B and D, we x z =  z and plot the functions against k and x, and the arrows indicate the direction
along which x increases.
Panel A: e
k(k;z;  x) Panel B: e
k(k;  z;x)
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We now investigate whether our model can quantitatively reproduce the relations between
stock returns and nancing decisions that have attracted considerable attention in recent em-
pirical corporate nance literature. We follow the quantitative-theory approach of Kydland
and Prescott (1982) and Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) to conduct computational experi-
ments to compare the model moments with those in the data. Specically, we simulate 100
articial panels, each of which has 5,000 rms and 480 months. And the sample size is com-
parable to the COMPUSTAT data set often used in empirical studies. We then implement
empirical procedures on each articial panel, report cross-simulation averaged results, and
compare them to their counterparts in the real data.
We aim at a broad range of empirical studies in the literature. We rst study the cyclical
properties of equity issuance as applied to equity issuance waves and the predictive rela-
tions between the new equity share and aggregate stock market returns. Then we examine
the long-run stock-price performance and operating performance of issuing rms, as well as
the long-run stock-price performance of cash-distributing rms. Finally, we generate the
negative investment-return relation which is at the heart of our economic mechanisms.
4.1 Equity Issuance Waves
A larger number of rms issue common stocks and the proportion of external nancing ac-
counted for by equity is substantially higher in economic expansions (e.g., Taggart (1977),
Marsh (1982), and Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993)). In particular, Choe et al. docu-
ment that the relative frequency of equity oers, dened as the number of equity oerings
per month scaled by the number of listed rms, and the dollar volume of security oerings
scaled by CPI are both procyclical. And in multiple regressions, the new equity share, de-
16ned as the ratio of common stock issues to the sum of common stock and bond issues in
dollar volume per month, increases with business cycle measures such as the growth rate
of industrial production, and decreases with stock market volatility. Finally, neither stock
market run-up nor interest rate changes have signicant explanatory power in the presence
of business cycle measures and stock market volatility.
We ask whether our model can reproduce these empirical patterns. As in Zhang (2005b),
we dene expansions in articial data to be times when aggregate productivity is at least




we dene contractions to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional








1fejt>0g is the indicator function that takes a value of one if rm j issues equity and zero
otherwise. N is the total number of rms in the economy. Because we do not model entry
and exit in the model, N remains constant over time. More important, incorporating entry
and exit is likely to reinforce our basic results. The reason is that the frequency of entry or
Initial Public Oerings tends to be procyclical and the frequency of exit or delisting tends
to be countercyclical, as shown in Pastor and Veronesi (2005).





j=1 kjt. And because we do not model debt, we dene the new equity share





j=1(ejt+yjt). We caution that our denition of the equity share does not
correspond exactly with the denition in the empirical literature (e.g., Baker and Wurgler
(2000)). But our denition seems to capture the essence underlying the new equity share
without complicating greatly the basic model structure.
17Table 3 : Conditional Moments of Equity Issuance
This table reports conditional moments of equity issuance from simulated panels. We report the average
frequency of equity issuance, the rate of aggregate equity nancing, and the share of new equity in total
nancing, all conditional on the economy being in expansions or contractions. We dene expansions in
simulated panels to be times when aggregate productivity is at least one unconditional standard deviation
above its long-run average, i.e., xt >  x+ x p
1 2
x
, and we dene contractions to be times when aggregate




The relative frequency of equity issuance is dened in the model as
PN
j=1 1fejt>0g
N , where 1fejt>0g is the
indicator function that takes a value of one if rm j issues equity and zero otherwise, and N =5;000 is the
total number of rms in the simulated economy. The rate of aggregate equity nancing is dened as the total




j=1 kjt. Because we do not model debt, we measure the





j=1(ejt+yjt). For simulations create 100 articial panels each with 5000 rms and 480 monthly
observations. The table reports the cross-simulation averaged results.
Panel A: Expansions Panel B: Contractions
The frequency The aggregate equity The new The frequency The aggregate equity The new
of equity issuance nancing rate equity share of equity issuance nancing rate equity share
0.825 0.030 0.526 0.015 0.002 0.036
Using simulated panels, we compute the average frequency of equity issuance, the average
rate of aggregate equity nancing, and the average new equity share conditional on the
economy being in expansions or contractions. Table 3 reports the results. We observe that
equity issuance is strongly procyclical. The relative frequency of equity issuance is 82.5%
in expansions, and is only 1.5% in contractions. The rate of aggregate equity nancing is
3.0% in expansions and is 0.2% in contractions. Finally, the new equity share is 52.6% in
expansions and is only 3.6% in contractions. This procyclical pattern in our simulations is
consistent with the evidence in Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993).
We also use simulated data to regress contemporaneously the rate of aggregate equity








j=1(vjt 5 e djt 5), and stock
18Table 4 : Contemporaneous Regressions of the Rate of Aggregate Equity Financing
and the New Equity Share in Total Financing onto Macroeconomic Variables

















j=1(vjt 5 e djt 5), and stock market volatility estimated
using the rolling prior 36 months of simulated data. We simulate 100 articial panels, each has 5000 rms
and 480 monthly observations. We perform the regressions on each simulated panel and report the cross-
simulation averageresults. The numbers in parentheses are the cross-simulation averaged t-statistics adjusted
for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelations of up to 12 lags.
Panel A: The rate of aggregate equity nancing Panel B: The new equity share
The growth rate of Prior six-month Stock market The growth rate of Prior six-month Stock market







1.37 0.01 0.16 22.27 0.03 0.74
(22.68) (2.95) (7.69) (29.37) (0.77) (3.17)
market volatility estimated with the rolling prior 36 months of simulated data. From Table
4, the results are largely consistent with Choe, Masulis, and Nanda (1993). In particular,
the rate of aggregate equity nancing and the new equity share both correlate positively
with the growth rate of industrial production and with the stock market returns.
4.2 Predicting Stock Market Returns with the New Equity Share
In an important article, Baker and Wurgler (2000) show that the share of new equity issues in
total new equity and debt issues is a strong, negative predictor of future stock market returns.
Baker and Wurgler interpret this evidence as suggesting that rms time the market compo-
nent of their returns when issuing equity to exploit systematic mispricing in market returns.
We show that our model without mispricing can largely replicate the Baker and Wurgler
19Table 5 : Univariate, Predictive Regressions of One-Year-Ahead Market Returns
This table reports univariate, predictive regressions of annual percentage stock market returns on three
regressors. The regression equation is rt+1 =a + bXt + et+1; where rt denotes the real percentage returns
on the value-weighted (vw) market portfolio or the equally-weighted (ew) market portfolio. Xt denotes the
regressors including the dividend-to-price ratio, the book-to-market ratio, or the new equity share in the
sum of total new equity and internal funds. The dividend-to-price ratio, the book-to-market ratio, and the
equity share in new issues are standardized to have zero mean and unit variance. We simulate 100 articial
panels, each of which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the predictive regressions
on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation averaged slopes and test statistics. For comparison,
we also report in data columns the results from Table 3 of Baker and Wurgler (2000).
Panel A: Dividend-to-price Panel B: Book-to-market Panel C: The new equity share
Data Model Data Model Data Model
b t(b) b t(b) b t(b) b t(b) b t(b) b t(b)
vw 5.01 (2.12) 12.99 (3.38) 4.61 (1.79) 14.32 (3.81)  7:42 ( 3:86)  10:49 ( 2:59)
ew 5.75 (2.04) 13.38 (3.50) 13.06 (2.83) 14.37 (3.84)  13:12 ( 3:64)  10:47 ( 2:60)
(2000) evidence. Specically, we perform univariate, predictive regressions of one-year-ahead




j=1(vjt e djt), on the




j=1(vjt e djt), and on the new equity share. Following
Baker and Wurgler (2000), we standardize all the predictors so that they have zero mean
and unit variance. The rationale is to make the slope coecients of dierent regressors
comparable to each other. And as dependent variables, we use annual percentage returns on
both value-weighted and equal-weighted market portfolios.
Table 5 reports the results. The model largely reproduces the predictive regression results
obtained in the data. The dividend yield and the aggregate book-to-market ratio are both
signicantly positive predictors of future stock market returns. More important, the new
equity share is a signicantly negative predictor of future stock market returns.
We caution again that our denition of the equity share in the model does not correspond
exactly with that in Baker and Wurgler (2000). This dierence makes direct comparison be-
20tween our simulation results and their evidence somewhat dicult. However, our denition
does capture the basic intuition underlying the predictive power of the new equity share, i.e.,
the strong procyclicality of the new equity share gives rise to its negative correlation with
the countercyclical aggregate expected returns.
4.3 The Long-Term Underperformance Following Seasoned
Equity Oerings
In an inuential contribution, Loughran and Ritter (1995) document that rms issuing eq-
uity earn much lower returns on average over the next three to ve years than nonissuing
rms with similar characteristics (see also Spiess and Aeck-Graves (1995)). The magnitude
of this underperformance varies over time. Firms issuing during light issuance periods do not
underperform much, while rms issuing during high-volume periods severely underperform.
To study whether our model can quantitatively generate this evidence, we replicate
Loughran and Ritter's (1995) analysis reported in their Table VIII. Specically, we use
simulated panels to perform Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions of
percentage stock returns onto the market value, book-to-market, and an issue dummy:
rjt+1 = b0 + b1 log(MEjt) + b2 log(BMjt) + b3 ISSUEjt + jt+1 (18)
where rjt+1 is the percentage return on stock j in from the beginning of month t to the
beginning of month t+1, and all the regressors are dated at the beginning of month t.
We dene market value in the model to be the ex-dividend rm value, vjt e djt, and book-
to-market to be
kjt
vjt e djt. Following Loughran and Ritter (1995), we evaluate MEjt as the
market value of equity of rm j on the most recent scal year that ended prior to the month
t. Similarly, BMjt is the book-to-market ratio of rm j on the most recent scal year that
21ended prior to the month t. And ISSUEjt is a dummy variable that takes a value of one if rm
j has conducted one or more equity issues within the previous ve years, and zero otherwise,
i.e., ISSUEjt1f
P59
=0 ejt >0g. We also halve the sample into months following light issuance
activity and months following heavy issuance activity. Specically, we partition the sample
on the basis of the fraction of the sample rms in a month that have issued equity during
the prior ve years. The light-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction below its
median, and the heavy-issuance sample has all the months with the fraction above its median.
From Table 6, the model does a decent job in reproducing the empirical evidence. When
the issue dummy is used alone, issuing rms underperform by 0.49% per month in the
data with a t-statistic of  3:98. And its model counterpart is 0.99% per month with a
t-statistic of  3:87. Controlling for size and book-to-market in the regressions reduces the
underperformance to 0.38% in the data and to 0.64% in the model, and both are signicant.
More important, the model also reproduces quantitatively the positive relation between
the magnitude of the underperformance and the volume of equity issuance. In the last two
regressions in Table 6, we divide the sample periods into months following light issuance
activity and months following heavy issuance activity. Loughran and Ritter (1995) show
that issuing rms underperform by an insignicant amount of only 0.17% per month
following light issuance activity but by a signicant amount of 0.60% following heavy issuance
activity. From the last column, issuing rms following light issuance activity in the model
underperform by an insignicant 0.32% per month, while issuing rms following heavy
issuance activity underperform by a signicant 0.95% per month.
22Table 6 : Fama-MacBeth (1973) Monthly Cross-sectional Regressions of Percentage
Stock Returns on Size, Book-to-Market, and a New Issues Dummy
This table reports the Fama-MacBeth (1973) monthly cross-sectional regressions: rjt+1=b0+b1 log(MEjt)+
b2 log(BMjt)+b3 ISSUEjt+jt+1, where rjt+1 denotes the percentage return on rm j during month t. MEjt
is the market value of rm j on the most recent scal year ending before month t. BMjt is the ratio of the
book value of equity to the market value of equity for rm j on the most recent scal year ending before
month t. And ISSUEjt is a dummy variable that equals one if rm j has conducted at least once equity
oerings within the past 60 months preceding month t, and equals zero otherwise. The light-issuance sample
has all the months with the fraction of issuing rms below its median, and the heavy-issuance sample has
all the months with the fraction of issuing rms above its median. We simulate 100 articial panels, each
of which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observations. We then perform the cross-sectional regressions on
each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation averaged slopes and Fama-MacBeth t-statistics. We
also compare our results to those reported in Loughran and Ritter (1995, Table VIII).
Sample log(ME) log(BM) ISSUE
Data Model Data Model Data Model
All months          0:49  0:99
        ( 3:98) ( 3:87)
All months  0:05 0:67 0.30 0.66  0:38  0:64
( 0:91) (4:52) (4.57) (8.36) ( 3:68) ( 2:87)
Periods following  0:26 0:31 0.20 0.42  0:17  0:32
light volume ( 3:12) (2:28) (1.80) (5.77) ( 1:19) ( 0:90)
Periods following 0.16 1:03 0.39 0.90  0:60  0:95
heavy volume (2.11) (6:16) (6.30) (9.43) ( 3:98) ( 4:24)
4.4 The Long-Term Operating Performance Following Seasoned
Equity Oerings
In another inuential article, Loughran and Ritter (1997) document that the operating
performance of issuing rms displays substantial improvement prior to the equity oerings,
but then deteriorates. Issuing rms are also disproportionately high-investing and high-
growth rms. The authors interpret their evidence as consistent with Jensen's (1993)
hypothesis that corporate culture excessively focuses on growth, and managers are as
overoptimistic about the future protability of the issuing rms as outside investors.
We show that our model without empire-building and overoptimism can quantitatively
23reproduce the Loughran and Ritter (1997) evidence. To this end, we use simulated panels
to replicate their Table II by reporting the medians of the operating performance for issuing
rms and matching rms for nine years around the issuance. Specically, following Loughran
and Ritter, we choose matching nonissuers by matching each issuing rm with a rm that
has not issued equity during the prior ve years as follows. If there is at least one nonissuer
in the same industry with end-of-year zero assets within 25 to 200 percent of the issuing
rm, the nonissuer with the closest operating income-to-asset ratio is used.2 We also report
the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the issuers and nonissuers using
the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test, and the Z-statistics testing the equality of
distributions between the changes in the ratios from year 0 to year +4.3 Under the null
hypothesis that the issuer and the nonissuer measures are drawn from the same distribution,
Z follows a standard normal distribution.
We consider four operating performance measures: (i) OIBD/assets, where OIBD denotes
operating income before depreciation, measured as
yjt
kjt in the model; (ii) return on assets
or protability, measured as
kjt+1 kjt+e djt
kjt in the model, (iii) the investment-to-asset ratio,
measured as
ijt
kjt in the model; and (iv) market-to-book, measured as
vjt e djt
kjt in the model.
Table 7 reports the quantitative results. Consistent with the evidence in Loughran and
Ritter (1997), issuers in the model experience deterioration in the operating performance.
After equity issuance, the operating income-to-asset ratios and protability of issuers become
signicantly lower than those of nonissuers. However, the model-implied operating income-
2In the real data, if no nonissuer meets this criterion, Loughran and Ritter (1997) then rank all nonissuers
with year 0 assets of 90 to 110 percent of the issuer, and the rm with the closest, but higher operating
income-to-asset ratio is used. Because we do not distinguish dierent industries in the model, we simply use
the 25 to 200 percent restriction on end-of-year zero assets to choose matching nonissuer.
3Denote the dierence in the accounting measure between issuer i and its matching rm by dii 
measure(issueri)  measure(nonissueri). We rank the absolute values of the dii from 1 to Ne, the total
number of issuing rms. We then sum the ranks of positive values of dii, and denote the sum with D. The
Z-statistics are computed as Z=
D E[D]










24to-asset and protability levels are on average much higher than those observed in the data.
The reason is probably that the denominator in the model variables corresponds to the xed
assets in the data, which are only part of the total assets.
What drives the deteriorating accounting performance of rms after issuing equity? Intu-
itively, the rm-level protability in the model is driven by the persistent and mean-reverting
rm-specic productivity in equation (2). Therefore, ex-post, issuers tend to be rms that
have recently experienced extremely high rm-specic shocks, "z
jt+1. But going forwards, is-
suers face the same conditional, standard normal distribution of these shocks as other rms
do. When we as econometricians look at the historical sample, we are likely to observe
the mean-reverting behavior in the cross-sectional dierence in productivity, zjt, measured
empirically as the dierences in protability between issuers and matching nonissuers.
Table 7 also shows that issuers in the model have persistently higher investment-to-asset
and market-to-book ratios than matching nonissuers. And from Panel C, these dierences
are mostly signicant. Moreover, the model does a decent job in matching the mean-reverting
behavior of the investment-to-asset and market-to-book ratios.
4.5 The Long-Term Performance of Firms Distributing Cash
When rms raise capital, they underperform matching rms in the future three to ve years.
But when rms distribute cash back to shareholders, they outperform matching rms. For
example, Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) show that the average abnormal
four-year buy-and-hold return after the announcements of open market share repurchases
is 12.1% in 1980{1990. And the average abnormal return is 45.3% for value rms, but is
insignicantly negative for growth rms. Similarly, Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995)
show that stock prices continue to drift in the same direction in the years following the
25Table 7 : Median Operating Performance Measures and Market-to-Book for Issuers
and Matching Nonissuers
Panels A and B report the median operating performance measures for the issuing and matching rms.
Panels C and D report the Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions between the issuers and matching
nonissuers using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs singed-ranks test. We simulate 100 articial panels, each of
which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observations. The monthly ow variables are aggregated within
a given year to create annual variables. Stock variables are measured at the beginning of the year. We
perform the tests on each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average results. We also compare
our results to those reported in Table II of Loughran and Ritter (1997).
Event year Operating Protability Investment- Market-to-book
income-to-asset to-asset
Panel A: Issuer medians
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
 4 16.1% 26.0% 5.8% 12.7% 8.2% 0.6% 1.20 1.45
 3 16.6% 26.9% 6.0% 16.0% 8.5% 1.8% 1.42 1.54
 2 16.4% 28.5% 6.0% 19.6% 9.9% 7.0% 1.59 1.77
 1 17.0% 30.1% 6.4% 23.4% 10.2% 13.5% 2.40 1.95
0 15.8% 27.8% 6.3% 27.2% 10.0% 23.1% 1.96 2.48
+1 14.2% 25.8% 5.3% 15:7% 10.6% 23.4% 1.68 2.22
+2 12.7% 24.5% 3.9% 13.1% 9.3% 19:2% 1.65 2.09
+3 12.1% 23.6% 3.3% 13.3% 8.7% 16:6% 1.58 2.00
+4 12.1% 23.0% 3.2% 13.1% 8.1% 14:7% 1.43 1.97
Panel B: Nonissuer medians
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
 4 16.4% 25.5% 6.1% 9.9% 5.0% 3.5% 1.04 1.48
 3 15.6% 25.8% 5.8% 12.2% 5.4% 1.3% 1.12 1.45
 2 15.4% 26.3% 5.3% 14.0% 5.6% 0.6% 1.19 1.45
 1 15.1% 27.0% 5.5% 15.7% 5.7% 1.2% 1.30 1.48
0 15.8% 27.8% 5.7% 17.4% 5.9% 3.0% 1.45 1.55
+1 15.2% 26.8% 5.3% 19.7% 6.5% 6.4% 1.41 1.69
+2 14.1% 25.6% 4.8% 18.3% 6.5% 10.1% 1.43 1.81
+3 13.8% 24.8% 4.6% 16.3% 6.6% 12.0% 1.48 1.86
+4 13.5% 24.2% 4.2% 15.8% 6.6% 13.4% 1.44 1.91
Panel C: Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions
between the issuers and matching nonissuers
 4  0:92  0.03  2:10 4.84 12.00  8.26 3.65  4.14
 3 2.87  2:74 1.12 9.36 13.69 3.71 5.64 10.41
 2 4.73  7:48 3.42 15.40 16.16 23.56 8.87 32.07
 1 7.68  14:69 6.58 23.56 17.10 43.96 16.98 42.53
0  1:06  49:80 6.50 32:77 15.46 49:58 10.36 47:56
+1  3:02 5:65 0.35  13:83 14.55 40:27 7.52 26:60
+2  5:29 4:92  5:26  16:29 11.24 20:57 4.11 11:81
+3  5:40 4:90  6:58  8:70 8.64 8:81 1.74 1:44
+4  4:43 4:64  5:76  7:54 7.91 0:63  0:51  0:85
Panel D: Z-statistics testing the equality of distributions
between the change in the ratios from year 0 to year +4
0 to +4  4:59 5:09  5:57  7:46  5:96 59:25  8:52 45:70
26announcements of dividend initiations and omissions.
To study whether our model can quantitatively generate these empirical results, we
replicate Tables 3 and 4 in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) using our simulated
panels. In the model, we identify rms with positive dividends as those conducting stock
repurchase in the data. Our model only pins down the total amount of payout, not its specic
forms: the Miller-Modigliani (1991) dividend irrelevancy theorem holds in our neoclassical
model. We report mean annual returns from buying an equally-weighted portfolio of
repurchasing rms, beginning in the month following the repurchase and for the subsequent
four years. We also report total compounded returns for up to four years, and compare the
returns of the cash-distributing rms to returns of reference portfolio.
We follow closely Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995) in forming our reference
portfolio. All rms in our simulated panel are sorted each month into one of 50 size and
book-to-market portfolios by taking the intersections of ten size deciles and ve book-to-
market quintiles. Then all rms are ranked in the beginning of calendar year and are held
for the following 12 months. Beginning in the next month, the one-year buy-and-hold return
is calculated for each rm in a given portfolio. We use the equally-weighted average of all
annual returns in a given portfolio as the benchmark return for the rms ranked in that
particular size and book-to-market portfolio. The ranking of a particular rm may change
from year to year. To accommodate this feature, we allow the benchmark to change over time.
Table 8 reports annual buy-and-hold returns and compounded holding period returns up
to four years following share repurchases, both in the data and in the model. The table
shows that cash-distributing rms indeed earn higher average returns than nondistributing
rms. But the magnitudes of the dierences seem much lower in the simulated data than
those in the real data.
27Table 8 : Annual Buy-and-Hold Returns and Compounded Holding Period Returns
Up to Four Years Following Market Share Repurchases
This table reports annual and compounded buy-and-hold percentage returns following share repurchases
for up to four years. Compounded holding-period returns assume annual rebalancing. We form equally-
weighted portfolios for the whole sample. We construct the reference portfolio using benchmark returns
corresponding to the repurchase sample, matched on the basis of size and book-to-market ranking. To form
reference portfolio, we sort all rms in our simulated panel each month into one of 50 size and book-to-
market portfolios (the intersections of ten size deciles and ve book-to-market quintiles). We rank all rms
in the beginning of calendar year and hold them for the following 12 months. Beginning in the next month,
we calculate the one-year buy-and-hold return for each rm in a given portfolio. We then use the equal-
weighted average of all annual returns in a given portfolio as the benchmark returns for rms ranked in that
particular size and book-to-market portfolio. We rebalance the portfolio annually. We simulate 100 articial
panels, each of which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observations. We perform the empirical analysis on
each simulated panel and report the cross-simulation average results. We also compare our results to those
reported in Table 3 of Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995).
Panel A: Annual buy-and-hold returns Panel B: Compounded holding period returns
Repurchase Reference Dierence Repurchase Reference Dierence
rms portfolio rms portfolio
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Year 1 20.80 10.56 18.76 9.81 2.04 0.74 20.80 10.56 18.76 9.81 2.04 0.74
Year 2 18.12 8.93 15.81 8.71 2.31 0.22 42.69 19.56 37.53 18.47 5.16 1.06
Year 3 21.77 8.26 17.18 8.12 4.59 0.14 73.75 27.98 61.15 26.49 12.60 1.49
Year 4 8.56 7.86 9.51 7.77  0:96 0.10 88.62 36.44 76.48 34.30 12.14 2.14
We also examine the annual buy-and-hold returns and compounded holding-period
returns following cash distribution by book-to-market quintiles. We rank all rms into
size deciles, and further sort each decile into book-to-market quintiles. The lowest book-to-
market ratios are assigned to quintile one. We form the reference portfolio using benchmark
returns corresponding to the repurchase sample, matched on size and book-to-market.
From Table 9, the model can reproduce the empirical pattern that the magnitude of the
long-run stock-price drift following cash distribution is stronger in value rms than that in
growth rms (e.g., Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, Table 4)). However, the
magnitudes of the drift in the model are again much lower than that observed in the data.
28Table 9 : Annual Buy-and-Hold Returns and Compounded Holding Period Returns
by Book-to-Market Quintiles Following Cash Distribution
This table reports annual and compounded buy-and-hold percentage returns for equally-weighted portfolios
of rms distributing cash for up to four years following market share repurchases by book-to-market quintile
ranking. Compounded holding-period returns assume annual rebalancing. Ranks are determined by sorting
all rms into size deciles. Each decile is further sorted into quintiles on the basis of book-to-market, with the
lowest ratios assigned to quintile one. We form the reference portfolio using benchmark returns corresponding
to the repurchase sample, matched on the basis of size and book-to-market ranking. We create 100 articial
panels of 5000 rms each and with 480 observations for each rm. The unit time period is one month.
We perform these analysis on each simulated panel and report across-simulation averaged results, and we
compare our results to those reported in Ikenberry, Lakonishok, and Vermaelen (1995, Table 4).
Annual buy-and-hold returns Compounded holding period returns
Repurchase Reference Dierence Repurchase Reference Dierence
rms portfolio rms portfolio
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Panel A: Book-to-market quintile 1 (growth stocks)
Year 1 15.72 11.17 16.83 10.47  1:11 0.70 15.72 11.17 16.83 10.47  1:11 0.70
Year 2 17.86 9.95 16.60 9.83 1.26 0.12 36.40 21.46 36.22 20.56 0.18 0.90
Year 3 12.00 9.46 13.61 9.38  1:61 0.07 52.77 31.73 52.77 30.51  1:98 1.23
Year 4 4.98 9.14 6.42 9.04  1:44 1.11 60.38 42.42 60.38 40.55  4:31 1.89
Panel B: Book-to-market quintile 2
Year 1 20.59 10.98 18.43 10.33 2.16 0.65 20.59 10.98 18.43 10.33 2.16 0.65
Year 2 12.34 9.51 15.07 9.36  2:73 0.14 35.47 20.67 36.28 19.79  0:81 0.88
Year 3 22.39 8.85 17.29 8.77 5.10 0.08 65.80 29.99 59.84 28.74 5.96 1.25
Year 4 3.20 8.51 6.99 8.41  3:79 0.10 71.10 39.47 71.02 37.54 0.08 1.93
Panel C: Book-to-market quintile 3
Year 1 19.49 10.90 16.46 10.29 3.03 0.62 19.49 10.90 16.46 10.29 3.03 0.62
Year 2 18.23 9.31 17.33 9.11 0.90 0.20 41.27 20.28 36.64 19.38 4.63 0.91
Year 3 20.77 8.48 16.57 8.36 4.20 0.12 70.61 28.98 59.29 27.67 11.32 1.32
Year 4 7.45 8.09 10.35 8.01  2:90 0.09 83.32 37.71 75.78 35.71 7.54 2.00
Panel D: Book-to-market quintile 4
Year 1 23.43 10.81 22.84 10.19 0.59 0.62 23.43 10.81 22.84 10.19 0.59 0.62
Year 2 15.16 8.98 12.73 8.78 2.43 0.20 42.14 19.78 38.48 18.84 3.66 0.93
Year 3 24.05 8.04 18.32 7.90 5.73 0.14 76.32 27.84 63.85 26.44 12.47 1.40
Year 4 12.44 7.65 11.06 7.53 1.38 0.12 98.24 35.82 81.97 33.69 16.27 2.13
Panel E: Book-to-market quintile 5 (value stocks)
Year 1 24.15 10.50 19.49 9.69 4.66 0.82 24.15 10.50 19.49 9.68 4.66 0.82
Year 2 26.01 8.35 17.23 8.08 8.78 0.27 56.44 18.72 40.08 17.51 6.36 1.21
Year 3 29.81 7.38 20.49 7.21 9.32 0.17 103.07 25.94 68.78 24.23 34.29 1.71
Year 4 16.17 6.87 12.94 6.77 3.23 0.10 135.91 32.86 90.62 30.50 45.29 2.37
294.6 Capital Investment, External Finance, and Stock Returns
The nance-related anomalies are intimately linked to the investment-return relation.
Richardson and Sloan (2003) document that the negative relation between external nance
and future stock returns varies systematically with the use of the proceeds. When the pro-
ceeds are invested in net operating assets as opposed to being stored as cash, there exists a
stronger negative relation. And there is no evidence on the negative relation for renancing
transactions. Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2005) document that adding a return factor based
on real investment into calendar-time factor regressions makes underperformance following
equity issuances largely insignicant and reduces its magnitude by 37{46%. This evidence
highlights the importance of capital investment in driving the nancing-related anomalies.
To study the investment-return relation in our model, we reproduce the main empirical
analysis of Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), who recently document a negative, rm-level
relation between capital investment and average subsequent returns.4 Both Richardson and
Sloan and Titman et al. interpret this evidence as investors underreaction to empire building
implications of real investment. As we show below, our model without underreaction or
empire building can quantitatively reproduce the negative investment-return relation.
To this end, we use simulated panels to form ve portfolios based on capital investment
(abbreviated as CI hereafter). Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), we dene CI that
corresponds to the portfolio formation year t as CIjt 1 =
CEjt 1
(CEjt 2+CEjt 3+CEjt 4)=3   1, where
CEjt 1 is rm j's capital expenditure scaled by sales during year t 1. We measure CEjt 1
in the model as the investment-to-output ratio,
ijt 1
yjt 1, because the output price is normalized
to be one. The last three-year moving-average capital expenditure in the denominator of
4This negative investment-return relation is well-known in the aggregate data, see Cochrane (1991). Other
empirical studies documenting the negative investment-return relation in the rm-level include Anderson and
Garcia-Feij oo (2005), Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2005), and Xing (2005).
30CIjt 1 is used to project the rm's benchmark investment.
In the beginning of year t, we sort all rms into quintiles based on their year t 1 CI
measures in ascending order. The rms remain in these portfolios for the whole year t; the
portfolios are rebalanced annually. We then construct a CI-spread portfolio that has a long
position in the two lowest CI portfolios and a short position in the two highest CI portfolios.
The returns for this zero-cost portfolio are calculated by subtracting the average returns of
the highest CI portfolios from the average returns of the lowest CI portfolios.
We also calculate the value-weighted monthly excess returns for each CI portfolio from
year t to t + 1. Following Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), we measure excess returns relative
to benchmarks constructed to have similar rm characteristics such as size, book-to-market,
and price momentum. Specically, we form 125 benchmark portfolios that capture these
characteristics. Starting in year t, the universe of common stocks is sorted into ve portfolios
based on rm size at the end of year t 1. And the breakpoints for size are obtained by
sorting all rms into quintiles based on their size measures at the end of year t 1 in ascending
order. The size of each rm in our sample is then compared with the breakpoints to decide
which portfolio the rm belongs to. Firms in each size portfolio are further equally sorted
into quintiles based on their book-to-market ratio at the end of year t 1. Finally, the rms
in each of the 25 size and book-to-market portfolios are equally sorted into quintiles based
on their prior-year return. In all, we obtain 125 benchmark portfolios.
We calculate excess returns using these 125 characteristic-based benchmark portfolios.
Each year, each stock is assigned to a benchmark portfolio according to its rank based on size,
book-to-market, and prior returns. Excess monthly returns of a stock are then calculated
by subtracting the returns of the corresponding benchmark portfolio from the returns of
this particular stock. The excess returns on individual stocks are then used to calculate the
31value-weighted excess monthly returns on the test portfolios that are formed based on CI.
Table 10 reports the results both in the data and in the simulations. Consistent with
Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), Panel A reports that rms with low CI earn higher average
returns than rms with high CI. The model-implied average CI-spread is 10.6% per annum,
which falls short of that documented in the data, 16.9%.
We also perform the following Fama-MacBeth cross-sectional regressions
rjt+1 = 0t + 1tCIjt + 2tCIjt  DCFjt + jt+1 (19)
where rjt+1 is the benchmark-adjusted value-weighted return on individual stock i during
period t. DCF is the dummy variable based on the cash ow, measured as operating income
scaled by total assets,
yjt
kjt in the model. If rm j's cash ow is above the median cash ow
of the year, DCF equals one, otherwise it equals zero.
Panel B of Table 10 suggests that, consistent with Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004), there
exists a negative correlation between future stock return and capital investment in the sim-
ulated data. And the magnitude of this correlation increases with the operating income-to-
asset ratio, as shown by the negative slope of 2t for the interaction term, CIjtDCFjt. The
model-implied slopes are also quantitatively similar to those observed in the data.
5 Related Literature
We briey discuss our connection to the literature in this section. Brav, Geczy, and
Gompers (2000) document that the underperformance following seasoned equity oerings is
concentrated primarily in small-growth issuing rms, and suggest that the underperformance
reects a more pervasive return pattern related to size and book-to-market. We provide an
32Table 10 : Excess Returns of Capital Investment (CI) Portfolios
Panel A presents the distribution of excess returns on ve CI portfolios and the CI-spread portfolio. CI
denotes the capital investment measure. We use investment-to-asset ratio to create the CI portfolios.
We report the monthly mean excess returns, the standard deviation, the maximum, the median, and the
minimum of the excess returns. The CI portfolios are constructed as follows. In year t, all stocks are
sorted into quintiles based on their CI measures in ascending order to form ve CI portfolios. Value-
weighted monthly excess returns on a portfolio are calculated from year t to year t+1. The excess return
on an individual stock at time t is calculated by subtracting the returns of characteristic-based benchmark
portfolios from the stock return at time t. The CI-spread denotes the zero-investment portfolio that has a
long position in the two lowest CI portfolios and a short position in the two highest CI portfolios. The
return series for this portfolio is calculated by subtracting the sum of the returns on the highest two
portfolios from that on the two lowest CI portfolios, and then dividing the result by two. All portfolios
are rebalanced annually. Panel B reports the results of the Fama-MacBeth (1973) cross-sectional regression:
rjt+1=0t+1tCIjt+2tCIjt DCFjt+jt+1, where rjt+1 is the benchmark-adjusted value-weighted return on
individual stock j at during month t. DCF is the dummy variable based on cash ow, measured as operating
income scaled by total assets, measured in the model as
yjt
kjt. If the cash ow of one rm is above the median
cash ow of the year, its DCF equals one, and zero otherwise. We simulate 100 articial panels, each of
which has 5000 rms and 480 monthly observations. The monthly ow variables are aggregated within one
given year to create their corresponding annual variables. We perform the tests on each simulated panel and
report the cross-simulation average slopes and test statistics. We also compare our results to those reported
in Table 1 (Panel A) and Table 6 (Panel A) in Titman, Wei, and Xie (2004).
Panel A: Excess return distribution of capital investment portfolios
CI Portfolio Mean Std Max Median Min
Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model Data Model
Lowest 0.042 0.066 0.010 0.048 3.38 0.16 0.06 0.07  3:11  0:06
2 0.083 0.011 0.007 0.031 2.26 0.08 0.10 0.01  2:76  0:06
3 0.055  0:006 0.006 0.023 1.84 0.05 0.03  0:01  2:07  0:06
4  0:083  0:021 0.005 0.027 1.38 0.04  0:06  0:02  1:88  0:08
5  0:127  0:040 0.010 0.045 2.61 0.06  0:08  0:04  4:08  0:14
CI-spread 0.169 0.106 0.009 0.003 3.30 0.071 0.12 0.07  2:63 0:05
Panel B: rjt+1 = 0t + 1tCIjt + 2tCIjt  DCFjt + jt+1
CI CI  DCF
Data Model Data Model
  0:79  0:64  0:76  0:45
t-stat ( 2:80) ( 3:65) ( 2:19) ( 3:33)
33economic explanation of their evidence because the model suggests that both equity issuers
and small-growth rms are high-investing rms.
Eckbo, Masulis, and Norli (2000) report that a multifactor asset pricing model can reduce
the underperformance to an insignicant level, and argue that issuing rms are less risky
because their leverage ratios are lowered as a result of equity issuance. We complement
their work by suggesting the investment-based mechanism that can potentially drive their
risk evidence. Moreover, Lyandres, Sun, and Zhang (2005) document that even after equity
issuance, issuing rms have book and market leverage ratios substantially higher than those
of matching nonissuers, inconsistent with the leverage explanation of the underperformance.
Schultz (2003) argues that using event studies is likely to nd long-term underperformance
ex post, even though there is no underperformance ex ante.5 Weighing each period equally as
in calendar-time factor regressions solves this problem. We add to Schultz's (2003) pseudo-
market-timing insight in two ways. First, we provide an economic explanation for his key
premise that rms are more likely to issue when stock prices are high so they can receive more
for their equity. We show that optimal equity nancing is highly procyclical, i.e., rms invest
more and thus naturally issue more equity in expansions when stock prices are relatively high.
Second, our argument applies to event-time as well as calendar-time evidence because the
model predicts that issuing rms are expected to earn lower rates of returns ex ante.
Our work is also related to several other papers casting some doubt on behavioral mar-
ket timing, but from the perspective of capital structure choice. Leary and Roberts (2005)
argue that the persistence of leverage is likely driven by dynamic optimizing behavior with
adjustment costs. Hennessy and Whited (2005) construct a dynamic trade-o model with
5If early in a sample period, issuing rms underperform, there will be few issues in the future because
investors are less interested in them. The average performance will be weighed more towards the early issues
that underperformed. If early issuing rms outperform, there will be many more issues in the future. The
early performance will be weighed less in the average performance.
34endogenous leverage, payout, and investment and show that leverage varies negatively with
an external-nance-weighted-average Q, a result documented by Baker and Wurgler (2002).
Strebulaev (2003) constructs a dynamic trade-o model of capital structure with adjustment
costs and show that the model can reproduce the empirical relation between leverage and
stock return documented by Welch (2004). Liu (2005) shows that historical market-to-book
and stock return obtain their explanatory power of leverage because of adjustment costs and
the time-varying nature of the target leverage. None of these papers studies the predictive
relation between past nancing decisions and future stock returns, i.e., the return-related
evidence of behavioral market timing. Our work lls this gap.
More generally, our work is related to the literature that tries to understand the economic
determinants of the anomalies in the cross section of returns by analyzing rm decisions
(e.g., Berk (1995), Berk, Green, and Naik (1999), Gomes, Kogan, and Zhang (2003), Carl-
son, Fisher, and Giammarino (2004, 2005), Kogan (2004), Cooper (2005), and Zhang (2005a,
2005b)). Except for Carlson et al. (2005), these papers do not study the quantitative relation
between equity nancing and stock returns. We contribute to the literature along this line.
6 Conclusion
We use a fully-specied neoclassical model augmented with costly equity nancing as a
laboratory to study the quantitative relations between stock returns and equity nancing.
Simulations show that the model can simultaneously and in many cases quantitatively
reproduce: (i) procyclical equity issuance; (ii) the predictive relation between aggregate
equity share and stock market returns; (iii) long-term underperformance following equity
issuance and the positive relation of its magnitude with the volume of issuance; and (iv) the
mean-reverting behavior in the operating performance of issuing rms. Our model does not
35have apparent behavioral bias, we suggest that the evidence often interpreted as behavioral
underreaction to market timing or the window-of-opportunity theory of nancing decisions
can be potentially consistent with ecient markets.
However, although going in the right direction, our quantitative results on the positive
long-term stock price drift of cash-distributing rms and the positive relation between its
magnitude and book-to-market are fairly weak. Improving the quantitative performance of
the model along this dimension remains a signicant challenge for future research.
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40A Computational Appendix
We use the value function iteration procedure to solve the individual rm's problem given
in equation (12). We solve the value function and the optimal decision rule on a grid in a
discrete state space.
We specify a grid with 50 points for the capital stock with an upper bound k. The up-
per bound is large enough to be nonbinding at all times. We construct the grid for capital
stock recursively, following McGrattan (1999), i.e., ki = ki 1 + ck1 exp(ck2 (i   2)), where
i=1;:::;50 is the index of grid points and ck1 and ck2 are two constants chosen to provide
the desired number of grid points and k, given a pre-specied lower bound k. This recursive
construction assigns more grid points around k, where the value function has most of its
curvature. The state variables x and z in equations (1) and (2), respectively, are dened
on continuous state spaces. And to compute the numerical solution to the model, we need
to transform the continuous state spaces into discrete state spaces. Because both produc-
tivity processes are highly persistent in monthly frequency, we use the method described in
Rouwenhorst (1995). We use 15 grid points for x process and 17 points for z process. In all
cases our quantitative results are robust to ner grids.
Once the discrete state space is available, the conditional expectation operator in (12) can
be carried out as a matrix multiplication. The expected return Et[rjt+1]=Et[vjt+1]=(vjt djt)
can be calculated in the same way. We use piecewise linear interpolation extensively to
obtain rm value, optimal investment, and expected return, which do not lie directly on the
grid points. Finally, we use discrete, global search routine in maximizing the right-hand side
of the value function (12). This routine is slow but precise. Specically, we compute the
objective function on an even-spaced grid of k, with boundary [k;k] with 20,000 points. The
computer programs for solving the value function and for simulating the model are available
upon request.
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